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PROJECTIVE GAMES ON THE REALS
JUAN P. AGUILERA AND SANDRA MU¨LLER
Abstract. Let M♯n(R) denote the minimal active iterable extender model
which has n Woodin cardinals and contains all reals, if it exists, in which case
we denote by Mn(R) the class-sized model obtained by iterating the topmost
measure of Mn(R) class-many times. We characterize the sets of reals which
are Σ1-definable from R over Mn(R), under the assumption that projective
games on reals are determined:
(1) for even n, Σ
Mn(R)
1 = a
RΠ1n+1;
(2) for odd n, Σ
Mn(R)
1 = a
RΣ1n+1.
This generalizes a theorem of Martin and Steel for L(R), i.e., the case n = 0.
As consequences of the proof, we see that determinacy of all projective games
with moves in R is equivalent to the statement thatM♯n(R) exists for all n ∈ N,
and that determinacy of all projective games of length ω2 with moves in N is
equivalent to the statement that M♯n(R) exists and satisfies AD for all n ∈ N.
1. Introduction
In this article, we study the interplay between the determinacy of infinite games
on R whose payoff is projective and canonical transitive models of set theory that
contain R and finitely many Woodin cardinals.
Given a set x, let M ♯n(x) denote the minimal ω1-iterable active x-premouse with
n Woodin cardinals, if it exists, and let Mn(x) denote the proper-class model ob-
tained from M ♯n(x) by iterating its topmost measure Ord-many times. A theorem
of Woodin states that projective games on N are determined if, and only if, M ♯n(x)
exists for every n and every x ∈ R. Woodin’s proof of determinacy from the ex-
istence of M ♯n(x) is unpublished, but the result was later refined by Neeman [15],
who proved local versions of the theorem at each level of the projective hierarchy.
A proof of the other implication can be found in [14]. We refer the reader to Larson
[6] and the introduction of Neeman [15] for historical background.
The same way that the model Mn generalizes L, the model Mn(R) generalizes
L(R). An issue related to projective determinacy for games on R is that of identify-
ing the sets of reals that are Σ1-definable overMn(R).
1 We denote this collection by
Σ
Mn(R)
1 . For other related models, the following characterizations are well known:
Date: July 9, 2019.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. 03E45, 03E60, 03E15, 03E55.
Key words and phrases. Infinite Game, Determinacy, Inner Model Theory, Game Quantifier,
Large Cardinal, Mouse.
The first-listed author was partially supported by FWF grant numbers P 31063 and P 31955;
the second-listed author, formerly known as Sandra Uhlenbrock, was partially supported by FWF
grant number P 28157.
1By this, we mean Σ1-definable in the language set theory with additional predicates for R
and the extender sequence of Mn(R).
1
2 JUAN P. AGUILERA AND SANDRA MU¨LLER
Theorem 1.1.
(1) (Shoenfield) ΣL1 = Σ
1
2.
(2) (Steel [18]) ΣM2n1 = Π
1
2n+2; Σ
M2n+1
1 = Σ
1
2n+3.
(3) (Martin-Steel [10]) Σ
L(R)
1 = a
RΠ11.
Here, aR denotes the real-game quantifier (see the following section).
The characterization of ΣMn1 depends on the parity of n. Our main theorem is a
characterization of Σ
Mn(R)
1 that combines the ones for Mn and L(R), and exhibits
similar periodicity:
Theorem 1.2. Suppose that M ♯n(R) exists for all n.
(1) If n is even, then Σ
Mn(R)
1 = a
RΠ1n+1.
(2) If n is odd, then Σ
Mn(R)
1 = a
RΣ1n+1.
Theorem 1.2 relativizes to real parameters, as do all other results stated in their
lightface forms below.
The proof of Theorem 1.2 has two parts: first, the inclusion from right to left.
To the best of our knowledge, the argument here is new; it is similar for even and
odd n. In particular, it provides a new proof for the result in the case n = 0,
although it makes use of an additional determinacy hypothesis. The second part is
the inclusion from left to right. Here, however, we need slightly different arguments
for even and odd n. The one for even n is similar to the case n = 0, but makes use
of the games from [3]. The argument for odd n requires a variation of these games.
This is all done in Section 3 under an additional determinacy assumption.
In Section 4, we present applications of the characterization and its proof. First,
we prove an analogue of the Neeman-Woodin theorem for games on R which, com-
bined with the results from the preceding section yields Theorem 1.2:
Theorem 1.3. The following are equivalent:
(1) Projective determinacy for games on R;
(2) M ♯n(R) exists for all n ∈ N.
We suspect that, as is the case for games on N, the result can be improved to
yield equivalences at each level of the projective hierarchy:
Conjecture 1.4. Let n ∈ N. The following are equivalent:
(1) Π1n+1-determinacy for games on R;
(2) M ♯n(R) exists.
We remark that the instance of Conjecture 1.4 when n = 0 is true, by theorems
of Martin [8] and Trang [21].
We obtain a similar equivalence that results from augmenting the existence of
Mn(R) with the assertion that it satisfies the Axiom of Determinacy:
Theorem 1.5. The following are equivalent:
(1) Projective determinacy for games on N of length ω2;
(2) M ♯n(R) exists and satisfies AD for all n ∈ N.
We remark that Conjecture 1.4 implies its counterpart for Theorem 1.5 (this is
by our proof of Theorem 1.5).
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2. Preliminaries
We study infinite, two-player perfect-information games of the form
I x0 x2 . . .
II x1 x3 . . .
where each move xi is an element of ω
ω—a real number. In the game above, the
payoff set is given by a subset of (ωω)ω , i.e., a collection of sequences of reals of
length ω. Observe that, making use of a fixed (e.g., recursive) bijection between ω
and ω×ω, one can code elements of (ωω)ω by elements of ωω, and thus each subset
of (ωω)ω can be coded by a subset of ωω. If x ∈ ωω, we denote by x(i) the ith real
coded in this way.
If A ⊂ ωω × ωω, we denote by aRA the set of all x ∈ ωω such that Player I has
a winning strategy in the game with payoff
{(y(0), y(1), . . .) : (x, y) ∈ A}.
Similarly for other spaces. If Γ is a pointclass, we denote by aRΓ the pointclass of
all aRA such that A ∈ Γ.
2.1. Topological Remarks. We are interested in subsets of (ωω)ω whose codes
are definable over ωω with parameters—the projective sets. These are the sets that
can be obtained from open subsets of ωω (in the product topology) by applying
finitely many projections and complements. These are not the same sets which are
projective when (ωω)ω is regarded as a product of infinitely many discrete copies
of ωω, although proving the determinacy of these sets does not require greater
consistency strength, as we shall see later. To see that it does not require less
consistency strength, we need the following simple observation:
Lemma 2.1. Let T , S be topologies on a set X and let T ω and Sω be the product
topologies. Suppose that T ⊆ S; then T ω ⊆ Sω.
Proof. It suffices to verify that basic open sets of T ω are open in Sω. These sets
are of the form
U = {(x0, x1, . . .) ∈ X
ω : xi ∈ Ui for i ≤ n},
where n ∈ N and each of U0, . . . , Un is T -open, thus S-open, so U is also S
ω-
open. 
Remark 2.2. Let X be a discrete space. Thus, a set A ⊂ Xω is closed if, and only
if, it is the set of branches through some tree T on X . We may define a subset
of X to be Σ11 if it is the projection of a tree on X × ω, and go on to define the
projective hierarchy as usual. In particular, we might focus on the case X = ωω.
By Lemma 2.1, every set which is “projective” in this sense is also projective in the
usual sense. We state this as a corollary:
Corollary 2.3. Let X be the space (ωω)ω, viewed as a product of ωω with the usual
topology (so X is homeomorphic to ωω); and let Y be the space (ωω)ω viewed as a
product of discrete spaces. Then, every open (Borel, analytic, projective) set in X
is also open (Borel, analytic, projective) in Y .
Proof. Simply take T to be the usual topology on ωω and S to be the discrete
topology, and apply Lemma 2.1. 
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2.2. Inner Model Theory. We work with canonical, fine structural models with
large cardinals, i.e., premice. We refer the reader to e.g., Steel [20] for an intro-
duction, and to Mitchell-Steel [11], Schindler-Steel-Zeman [17], and Steel [19] for
additional background. For basic set-theoretic definitions and results we refer to
Kanamori [4] and Moschovakis [13].
We will use Mitchell-Steel indexing for extender sequences and the notation
from Steel [20]. We will consider relativized premice constructed over transitive
sets of reals X as in Steel [19]. We denote by Lpm = {∈˙, E˙, F˙ , X˙} the language of
relativized premice, where E˙ is the predicate for the extender sequence, F˙ is the
predicate for the top extender, and X˙ is the predicate for the set over which we
construct the premouse.
We say an X-premouse M = (J
~E
α ,∈, ~E,Eα, X) for ~E = (E˙)
M , Eα = (F˙ )
M ,
and X = (X˙)M is active if Eα 6= ∅. Otherwise, we say M is passive. We let
M |γ = (J
~E
γ ,∈, ~E ↾ γ,Eγ , X) for γ ≤M ∩Ord and writeM ||γ for the passive initial
segment of M of height γ. In particular, M ||OrdM denotes the premouse N which
agrees withM except that we let (F˙ )N = ∅. For an X-premouse, we denote by ΣM1
the pointclass of all sets that are Σ1-definable overM in the language Lpm. If M is
a premouse, we sometimes abuse notation by referring to other premice extending
M as “M -premice.”
We will make use of the notions of α-iterability, where α is an ordinal, and
its projective variants, Π1n-iterability. A definition of the latter can be found in
Steel [18]. To make the notation uniform, we say a premouse is Π11-iterable if it
is wellfounded. We will also make use of the fine structure of premice and the
usual comparison theorem, which can be found in Steel [20]. Let A be a real
number or a set of real numbers. We denote by M ♯n(A) the unique smallest sound,
ω1-iterable A-premouse which is not n-small, if it exists. Mn(A) denotes the proper-
class model that results from iterating the top extender of Mn(A) a proper-class
amount of times. Let us recall the degrees of correctness of the models M ♯n(x):
AssumingM ♯2n(x) exists, it is Σ
1
2n+2-correct. Similarly,M
♯
2n+1(x) is Σ
1
2n+2-correct,
but can compute Σ12n+3-truth by forcing over its collapse algebra. (This is a result
of Neeman. The result from (ω1 + 1)-iterability is due to Woodin; a proof can
be found in [14].) Thus, every Σ12n+3(x) set of reals has a member recursive in
M
♯
2n+1(x), so every model closed under x 7→ M
♯
2n+1(x) is Σ
1
2n+3-correct (this is
due to Woodin; see Steel [18]). The arguments also apply to the models M ♯n(A),
where A is a countable set of real numbers, and show that it is Σ1n+2-correct if n
is even, or Σ1n+1-correct if n is odd. Finally, they apply to generic extensions of
these models by small partial orders, say, of size smaller than the least measurable
cardinal. In particular, if g is anM ♯2n(A)-generic wellordering of A, thenM
♯
2n(A)[g]
is Σ1n+2-correct.
In our definition of M ♯n(A), we only demand ω1-iterability, rather than (ω1+1)-
iterability. This is because often ω1-iterability is all one can hope to obtain as a
consequence of determinacy in V . We refer the reader to [14] for details on how to
survive on a budget of strategies for countable trees.
Since we will be interested in the case X = R, we do not require X to be
countable. Here, we need a notion of iterability for X-premice that suffices to carry
out all relevant comparison arguments: we say that an X-premouse is countably
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iterable if all its countable elementary substructures are ω1-iterable.
2 Similarly,
we say that an X-premouse is countably Π1n-iterable if all its countable elementary
substructures are Π1n-iterable.
3. The Σ1 Subsets of Mn(R)
In this section, we shall characterize the pointclass of all sets which are Σ1-
definable over Mn(R), in the sense of the previous section. The characterization
depends on whether n is even or odd. Our proof of the local version of the theorem
requires determinacy for games on reals.
Theorem 3.1. Let n ∈ N. Suppose that M ♯n(R) exists and that Π
1
n+1 games on R
are determined.
(1) If n is even, then Σ
Mn(R)
1 = a
RΠ1n+1.
(2) If n is odd, then Σ
Mn(R)
1 = a
RΣ1n+1.
We shall prove the theorem by considering each inclusion separately in the cases
for even n and odd n.
Lemma 3.2. Let n ∈ N be even. Suppose that M ♯n(R) exists and that Π
1
n+1 games
on R are determined. Then
a
RΠ1n+1 ⊆ Σ
Mn(R)
1 .
Proof. Let G be a Π1n+1 game on reals (i.e., the payoff set for Player I is Π
1
n+1) and
A ⊆ R. We denote by GA the modification of G in which players are required to
make moves in A, under the penalty of losing the game (but without the require-
ment that the sequence of all moves belong to A; the payoff is computed with the
quantifiers ranging over all of R). Thus, G = GR.
If A is countable, and xA codes A, say
A = {x(i) : i ∈ N},
we may consider the following further variant of G, in which instead of playing reals
in A, players play their indices in x. We denote this variant by G(xA).
We observe that for a set A ∈ Pω1(R), Player I has a winning strategy in GA if,
and only if, she has one in G(xA), for any xA as above. Suppose that this is the case
for some A ∈ Pω1(R) and some xA ∈ R. By definition, G(xA) is a Π
1
n+1(xA) game
on N. Player I having a winning strategy for G(xA) is expressible by a formula in
aΠ1n+1(xA) = Σ
1
n+2(xA).
Claim 3.3. The following are equivalent:
(1) Player I has a winning strategy for G(xA), and
(2) there is some M ⊳Mn(A) with n Woodin cardinals such that
M |= “Coll(ω,A) Player I has a winning strategy for GA.”
Proof. Let g ⊆ Coll(ω,A) be Mn(A)-generic, with g ∈ V . Since n is even, the
model Mn(A)[g] is Σ
1
n+2-correct.
Suppose Player I has a winning strategy for G(g). By correctness,
Mn(A)[g] |= “Player I has a winning strategy for G(g).”
2This is non-standard, in the sense that one usually requires (ω1 + 1)-iterability here.
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From any strategy for G(g) one can extract a strategy for GA; this implies that
(1) Mn(A)[g] |= “Player I has a winning strategy for GA.”
It follows that
(2) Mn(A) |= “Coll(ω,A) Player I has a winning strategy for GA.”
Since the formula in (1) is Σ
Mn(A)[g]
1 , it holds if we replace Mn(A)[g] by a large
enough initial segment of it; (2) similarly holds if we replaceMn(A) by a sufficiently
large initial segment thereof. Thus, if Player I has a winning strategy G(g), then
there is some M ⊳Mn(A) such that
(3) M |= “Coll(ω,A) Player I has a winning strategy for GA,”
and such an M may be assumed to have n Woodin cardinals.
Suppose now that Player I does not have a winning strategy for G(g). Recall
that any premouse whose reals are closed under the operation
x 7→M ♯n−1(x)
is Σ1n+1-correct and thus Π
1
n+2 statements are downwards absolute to it. By the
comment following equation (3), this implies that if M is an initial segment of
Mn(A) with n Woodin cardinals, then
M |= “Coll(ω,A) Player I does not have a winning strategy for GA,”
which completes the proof of the claim. 
Suppose Player I has a winning strategy σ forG. LetW be the transitive collapse
of a countable elementary substructure of some large Vκ and A = R
W ; thus, GA is
W ’s version of G. By elementarity, there is a winning strategy σ¯ for GA in W , and
σ¯ agrees with σ on moves in W . σ¯ is not a total strategy for Player I in GA in V ,
but it can be regarded as one if we extend it so that arbitrary responses are given
if Player II ever makes a move outside of A. Because it agrees with σ on moves in
W , every full play by it in which Player II has played reals in A will be a winning
move in GA, and so σ¯ is a winning strategy for GA in V for Player I. By the claim,
there is some M ⊳Mn(A) with n Woodin cardinals such that:
M |= “Coll(ω,A) Player I has a winning strategy for GA.”
By the elementarity between Vκ and W , M
♯
n(R)
W is the transitive collapse of a
countable elementary substructure of M ♯n(R) and is therefore ω1-iterable. Thus,
M ♯n(R)
W =M ♯n(R
W ) =M ♯n(A),
so, by elementarity, there is some N ⊳Mn(R) with n Woodin cardinals such that:
N |= “Coll(ω,R) Player I has a winning strategy for G.”
The existence of such an N is Σ
Mn(R)
1 . To complete the proof of the lemma, it
suffices to assume that there is some N⊳Mn(R) as above and conclude that Player
I has a winning strategy in G.
Let W be the transitive collapse of a countable elementary substructure of some
large Vκ and A = R
W . Then, there is some M ⊳Mn(A) with n Woodin cardinals
such that M ∈ W and:
M |= “Coll(ω,A) Player I has a winning strategy for GA.”
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Let g ⊆ Coll(ω,A) be M -generic, with g ∈ V . Then,
M [g] |= “Player I has a winning strategy τ for G(g).”
Since M [g] has n Woodin cardinals and is thus Π1n+1-correct, and the statement
that τ is winning for Player I is Π1n+1(τ, g), τ really is a winning strategy for G(g).
Thus, Player I has a winning strategy for GA in V .
Suppose towards a contradiction that Player I does not have a winning strategy
for G. By our assumption on the determinacy of Π1n+1 games on R, Player II has
one, say σ. By elementarity, Player II has one for GA in W , say σ¯, and σ¯ agrees
with σ on moves in W , so it follows that σ¯ is a winning strategy for Player II for
GA in V as well, which is the desired contradiction. 
Lemma 3.4. Let n ∈ N be odd. Suppose that M ♯n(R) exists and that Π
1
n+1 games
on R are determined. Then,
a
RΣ1n+1 ⊆ Σ
Mn(R)
1 .
Proof. This is similar to the previous proof. Suppose now that G is Σ1n+1 (i.e., that
the winning set for Player I is Σ1n+1), so that the games G(xA) are Σ
1
n+1(xA). The
hypothesis implies Π1n+1-determinacy for games on N, so, using that n+ 1 is even,
we may appeal to the Third Periodicity Theorem (see Moschovakis [13, Corollary
6E.2]) to deduce that if I wins G(xA), then I has a winning strategy in ∆
1
n+2(xA).
All such reals belong to Mn(xA), by a theorem of Woodin (see Steel [18, Theorem
4.8]). The rest of the proof is as before. 
——
To complete the proof of the theorem, it remains to prove the converse inclusions
in the cases that n is even and odd. We will need the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5. Suppose either that Π1n+1 games on R are determined or that M
♯
n(R)
exists. Then, there is a closed, cofinal subset C of Pω1(R) such that if A ∈ C, then
M ♯n(A) ∩R = A.
Proof. The conclusion is proved under the assumption of Π1n+1-determinacy for
games on R in [3, Lemma 3.8]; there, it is stated under the stronger assumption of
determinacy for Π1n+1-determinacy for games of length ω
2, but the proof only re-
quiresΠ1n+1-determinacy for games on R. In the other case, there is a closed cofinal
subset of Pω1(R) consisting of sets A which are sets of reals of transitive collapses of
countable elementary substructures NA of some large Vκ, so thatM
♯
n(R)
NA embeds
elementarily into M ♯n(R) and thus is ω1-iterable and equal to M
♯
n(A). Since clearly
M ♯n(R) ∩R = R,
the result follows. 
Let us begin with the case of even n:
Lemma 3.6. Let n ∈ N be even. Suppose that M ♯n(R) exists. Then,
P(R) ∩Σ
Mn(R)
1 ⊆ a
RΠ1n+1.
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Lemma 3.6 is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.10 below. Its proof makes
use of model games for premice very similar to the ones in [3]. Here, Players I
and II play a sequence of reals and a theory in the language Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω}) of
premice with added constant symbols x˙i, for i ∈ ω. The rules of the game ensure
that any model M of the theory contains all reals played during the game and that
there is a minimal model, which consists of all elements of M definable from real
parameters (the definable closure of the reals of M).
Fix recursive bijections m(·) and n(·) assigning an odd number > 1 to each
Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω})-formula ϕ such that m and n have disjoint recursive ranges and
for every ϕ, m(ϕ) and n(ϕ) are larger than max{i : x˙i occurs in ϕ}. Fix some
enumeration (φi : i ∈ ω) of all Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω})-formulae such that x˙i does not
appear in φj if j ≤ i. Finally, fix a ternary formula θ(·, ·, ·) which for any RM -
premouse M uniformly defines the graph of an RM -indexed family of class-sized
wellorders whose union contains every set in M (see Steel [19, Proposition 2.4.1]
for an example of such a formula).
Definition 3.7. Let ϕ be a Lpm-formula and n ∈ N be even; we describe a game
Gevenϕ of length ω on R. A typical run of G
even
ϕ looks as follows:
I v0, x0 v1, x2 . . .
II x1 x3 . . .
Here, Players I and II take turns, respectively playing reals (vi, x2i) and x2i+1, for
i ∈ ω. We ask that vi ∈ {0, 1}.
Here vi will be interpreted as the truth value of the formula φi from the enumer-
ation fixed above. This can be thought of as Player I either accepting or rejecting
the formula φi. If so, the play determines a complete theory T in the language
Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω}).
Player I wins the game Gevenϕ if, and only if,
(1) For each i ∈ ω, T contains the sentence x˙i ∈ R and, moreover, for each
j,m ∈ ω, T contains the sentence x˙i(m) = j if, and only if, xi(m) = j.
(2) For every formula φ(x) with one free variable in the language Lpm({x˙i : i ∈
ω}), and m(φ) and n(φ) as fixed above, T contains the statements
∃xφ(x)→ ∃x∃α (φ(x) ∧ θ(α, x˙m(φ), x)),
∃x (φ(x) ∧ x ∈ X˙)→ φ(x˙n(φ)).
(3) T is a complete, consistent theory such that for every countable model M
of T and every model N ∗ which is the definable closure of {xi : i < ω} in
M ↾ Lpm, N ∗ is well-founded, and if N denotes the transitive collapse of
N ∗,
(a) N is a sound and solid n-small X-premouse, where X = {xi : i ∈ ω},
(b) N is Π1n+1-iterable (in the sense of [18, Definition 1.6]), and
(c) N  ϕ, but no proper initial segment of N satisfies ϕ.
If Player I plays according to all these rules, he wins the game. In this case there
is a unique premouse Np as in (3) associated to the play p = (v0, x0, x1, v1, x2, . . . )
of the game. Otherwise, Player II wins.
Observe that the winning set for Player I in the game Gevenφ is Π
1
n+1. Motivated
by the definition of Gevenϕ and the argument of [3], we introduce the following
definition for the proof:
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Definition 3.8. Let a ∈ Pω1(R) and ϕ be a formula in the language Lpm. We say
that an a-premouse is a ϕ-witness if it satisfies ϕ and a minimal ϕ-witness if, in
addition, it has no proper initial segment satisfying ϕ.
Lemma 3.9. If an a-premouse M satisfies a formula ϕ but no proper initial seg-
ment of M satisfies ϕ, then J1(M) projects to a.
Proof. This is because J1(M) satisfies a Σ1 fact that holds in none of its proper
initial segments (viz. the fact that some proper initial segment satisfies ϕ). 
Lemma 3.10. Let n be even and assume either Π1n+1-determinacy for games on
reals or that M ♯n(R) exists. Then, Player I has a winning strategy in G
even
ϕ if, and
only if, there is a sound, solid, countably iterable, n-small R-premouse satisfying ϕ.
Proof. Both of the possible hypotheses imply Π1n+1-determinacy for games on N,
which implies that the conclusion of the Comparison Theorem holds for every a ∈
Pω1(R) and every pair of countable n-small, ω1-iterable a-premice with no Woodin
cardinals or which project to a (see e.g., [14] for a proof of this).
If there is a premouse as in the statement of the lemma, then there is a least one,
say M (this follows from countable iterability, the remark just given, and Lemma
3.9). Player I can win Gevenϕ by playing the theory of M .
Conversely, suppose Player I has a winning strategy σ. We claim that there is
a closed, cofinal C ⊆ Pω1(R) such that for all a ∈ C some sound Π
1
n+1-iterable,
n-small a-premouse satisfies ϕ. To see this, we argue as in the proof of [3, Lemma
3.8, Case 1]: letW be the transitive collapse of a countable elementary substructure
Y of some large Vκ such that σ ∈ Y . It suffices to show that such a premouse exists
for a = RW . Letting σ¯ be the preimage of σ under the collapse embedding, we have
W |= “σ¯ is a winning strategy for I in Gevenϕ .”
Let h be a wellordering of a in order-type ω and consider the play p of Gevenϕ in
which Player II enumerates h and Player I responds according to σ. All proper
initial segments of this play belong to W , since σ¯ ∈ W and σ¯ agrees with σ on its
domain. It follows that the reals played in p are exactly those in a, and so, since
σ is a winning strategy, p determines a Π1n+1-iterable a-premouse as desired. As
claimed, there is a closed, cofinal C ⊆ Pω1(R) such that for all a ∈ C some sound
Π1n+1-iterable, n-small a-premouse satisfies ϕ. Moreover, each of these a-premice
has an initial segment none of whose proper initial segments satisfies ϕ.
Suppose M is such an a-premouse. Then, J1(M) projects to a by Lemma 3.9.
By Steel [18, Lemma 3.3], it is thus an initial segment ofM ♯n(a) (this is where we use
that n is even). Thus, for each a ∈ C, there is some M ⊳M ♯n(a) which satisfies ϕ.
Appealing to Lemma 3.5 (this is where the assumption of either Π1n+1-determinacy
for games on reals or the existence of M ♯n(R) is used), and refining C if necessary,
we may assume that
R ∩M ♯n(a) = a
for all a ∈ C.
For the remainder of this proof, if p is a sequence of reals, we denote by p∗
the set of all reals appearing in p. Now, if p is a countable sequence of reals, σ
applied to p yields a (possibly larger) countable sequence of reals and a theory Tp
whose minimal model is a Π1n+1-iterable, sound, minimal ϕ-witness Np. From the
conclusion of the previous paragraph follows that by replacing ϕ with the formula
ϕ∗ = “X˙ = R ∧ ϕ”
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and restricting the choice of p to elements of
{p : p∗ ∈ C},
we may assume that Np is a R
Np -premouse, RNp = p∗, and some M ⊳ M ♯n(p
∗)
is a ϕ-witness. Suppose p and q are two sequences of reals obtained via plays of
Gevenϕ consistent with σ and that p
∗, q∗ ∈ C. By [3, Lemma 3.4], Np and Nq are
ω1-iterable. We observe some facts about them:
Claim 3.11. The sequences p and q have the following properties:
(1) J1(Np) projects to p
∗.
(2) If p∗ = q∗, then Np = Nq.
(3) If p∗ ⊆ q∗, then there is an elementary embedding from Np into Nq; more-
over, the embedding is unique.
Proof. (1) follows from Lemma 3.9, and the fact that Np is a minimal ϕ-witness.
(2) is immediate from the minimality property of Np and Nq and noting that, by
(1), J1(Np) and J1(Nq) must be equal. The proof of (3) is as in Martin-Steel [10];
we sketch it:
Suppose otherwise and let (p, v) and (q, w) be plays with real parts p and q,
respectively (i.e., v and w denote the sequences of truth values played by Player
I), such that (p, v) and (q, w) are consistent with σ, but there is no elementary
embedding between Np and Nq. Choosem large enough such that for some formula
χ(x˙0, . . . , x˙i),
(1) there are numbers k0, k1, . . . , ki ≤ m such that for each j ≤ i, the jth real
of p is the kjth real of q, and
(2) the formulas χ(x˙0, . . . , x˙i) and χ(x˙k0 , . . . , x˙ki) are assigned different truth
values according to v and w.
Since in all turns after the mth, Player II is free to play whatever she desires,
one can find extensions (p′, v′) and (q′, w′) of (p ↾ m, v ↾ m) and (q ↾ m,w ↾ m)
in which the same reals have been played. Since the formulas χ(x˙0, . . . , x˙i) and
χ(x˙k0 , . . . , x˙ki) were assigned different truth values, the models corresponding to
(p′, v′) and (q′, w′) must be different, which contradicts (2). 
Now, let D be the directed system of all models of the form Np, where p is as
above, together with the embeddings given by the claim. The directed system is
countably closed, in the sense that for every countable subset D0 of D, there is a
fixed N0 ∈ D into which every member of D0 embeds elementarily; it follows that
D has a wellfounded direct limit which we identify with its transitive collapse M .
Write
jp : Np →M
for the direct limit elementary embedding. By elementarity, M is an n-small RM -
premouse satisfying ϕ; because the directed system has members containing arbi-
trary reals, RM = R. It remains to show that M is countably iterable. We use
the fact that, by elementarity, every element of M is definable over M from a real
parameter in M .3
3By this, we mean that for every a ∈ M , there is a first-order formula χ in the language Lpm
and a real number x in M such that a is the unique element of M satisfying χ(a, x) in M .
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Let M¯ be a(n uncollapsed) countable elementary substructure ofM . Since every
element of M is definable over M from a real parameter, we may assume without
loss of generality that
M¯ = {a ∈M : a is definable over M from a parameter in M¯ ∩ R}.
Let a ∈ C be such that RM¯ ⊆ a and a is the set of reals played in a run p of Gevenϕ
consistent with σ (this a exists e.g., by the argument for the existence of C we gave
earlier). Since
jp : Np →M
is elementary, RM¯ ⊆ a = jp[a] (= the pointwise image of a under jp), and every
element of M¯ is definable over M¯ from a real parameter in M¯ , we have M¯ ⊆ jp[Np],
and the embedding
j−1p ↾ M¯ : M¯ → Np
is elementary. Therefore, the transitive collapse of M¯ is ω1-iterable by the pullback
strategy. This proves the lemma. 
Moving on to odd n, we show:
Lemma 3.12. Let n ∈ N be odd. Suppose that M ♯n(R) exists. Then,
P(R) ∩ Σ
Mn(R)
1 ⊆ a
RΣ1n+1.
The argument here is similar to the preceding one, but there are a few differences.
We will need a game similar to Gevenϕ :
Definition 3.13. Let ψ be a formula in the language Lpm and n be odd. The
game Goddψ is defined just like G
even
ϕ , except that condition (3) is replaced by:
(3’) T is a complete, consistent theory such that for every countable model M
of T and every model N ∗ which is the definable closure of {xi : i < ω} in
M ↾ Lpm, N ∗ is well-founded, and if N denotes the transitive collapse of
N ∗,
(a) N is a sound and solid X-premouse which is not n-small, but all of
whose proper initial segments are n-small, where X = {xi : i ∈ ω},
(b) N is Π1n+1-iterable (in the sense of [18, Definition 1.4]),
4 and
(c) N does not have a proper initial segment satisfying ψ.
The canonical example of a model satisfying the first two conditions is M ♯n, and
this requires that n be odd (e.g., M ♯2 is not Π
1
3-iterable; as remarked by Steel [18,
p. 95]). Observe that if an RN -premouse N satisfies the first condition, then it
projects to RN . The winning set for Player I in the game Goddψ is Π
1
n+1; hence, the
winning set for Player II is Σ1n+1. To prove Lemma 3.12, it suffices to show:
Lemma 3.14. Let n be odd and assume that M ♯n(R) exists. Then, Player II has a
winning strategy in Goddψ if, and only if, there is a sound, countably iterable n-small
R-premouse satisfying ψ.
4It should be pointed out that this iterability assumption in general does not suffice for the
conclusion of the comparison theorem to hold between N and an n-small iterable premouse if N
is not n-small.
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Proof. Since M ♯n(R) exists, M
♯
n(a) exists for all a ∈ R and all a ∈ Pω1(R). By
Neeman [15], we have access to Π1n+1-determinacy for games on N.
If there is a premouse as in the statement of the lemma, then, as before, there is
a least one, say M . As noted above, M projects to R. Using that n is odd, we see
that if N is a countably Π1n+1-iterable R-premouse which is sound and tame but not
n-small and which projects to R, thenM is an initial segment of N .5 It follows that
for a closed, cofinal C ⊆ Pω1(R), if a ∈ C, then every Π
1
n+1-iterable a-premouse
which is sound and tame but not n-small and which projects to a has an initial
segment satisfying ψ. By a well-known characterization of closed-and-cofinalness
(see e.g., Larson [7]), there is a function
f : [R]<ω → R
such that
C = {a ∈ Pω1(R) : f [[a]
<ω] ⊆ a}.
Fix an enumeration e of ω<ω. Let σ be the following strategy for Player II in Goddψ :
Given a partial play p in which reals x0, . . . , xk have been played,
(1) if the finite set x0, . . . , xk is closed under f , let σ(p) = x0,
(2) otherwise, let (i0, i1, . . . il) be the least tuple (in the sense of e) such that
f(xi0 , xi1 , . . . , xil) 6∈ {x0, . . . , xk} and set
σ(p) = f(xi0 , xi1 , . . . , xil).
If p is a full play by σ and p∗ is its real part, then clearly p∗ is closed under f , so
p∗ ∈ C; thus σ is a winning strategy for Player II.
Suppose now that Player II has a winning strategy, say, σ. Since n is odd,M ♯n(R)
is countably Π1n+1-iterable. Consider the run p of G
odd
ψ in which Player II moves
according to σ and Player I moves according to the theory of M ♯n(R) and plays
the reals of a countable elementary substructure H of M ♯n(R) such that σ ∈ H .
Because H is closed under finite tuples, every real in p belongs to it; this gives
rise to a model Np which embeds into H (and hence into M
♯
n(R)) elementarily.
Thus, Np is Π
1
n+1-iterable, not n-small, and has no proper initial segment which is
not n-small. Since σ was a winning strategy for Player II, Np must have a proper
(and hence n-small) initial segment satisfying ψ. By elementarity,M ♯n(R) does too.
All initial segments of M ♯n(R) are countably iterable, so the proof of the lemma is
finished. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1. To derive Theorem 1.2, we need to
combine Theorem 3.1 with Lemma 4.2 below.
4. Applications
In this section, we list several applications of Theorem 3.1 and its proof. We
begin with a result on the correctness ofMn(R) concerning the existence of winning
strategies. Martin and Steel’s proof of Theorem 1.2 in the case n = 0 yields the
additional consequence that
(aRΠ11)
L(R) = aRΠ11.
5This follows from the countable iterability assumptions for M and N by relativizing Steel [18,
Lemma 3.1] to R-premice and applying it to the images ofM and N under the collapse embedding
within the transitive collapse of a countable elementary substructure of some sufficiently large Vκ.
PROJECTIVE GAMES ON THE REALS 13
Ours does not, although we can prove it directly, assuming more determinacy. We
do not know of a proof that does not require AD to hold in Mn(R).
Begin by observing that if M ♯n(R) exists and satisfies AD, then Σ
Mn(R)
1 has the
scale property, by Steel [19, Theorem 1.1]. If so, then by a well-known theorem of
Moschovakis [12], Σ
Mn(R)
1 has the uniformization property.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that n ∈ N, M ♯n(R) exists and satisfies AD, and that Π
1
n+1-
games on R are determined. Then,
(1) If n is even, then (aRΠ1n+1)
Mn(R) = aRΠ1n+1.
(2) If n is odd, then (aRΣ1n+1)
Mn(R) = aRΣ1n+1.
Proof Sketch. We suppose for definiteness that n is even; the other case is similar.
As the existence of winning strategies for games on R is upwards absolute from
Mn(R), it suffices to show that every Π
1
n+1 game on R has a winning strategy in
aRΠ1n+1. This follows from the proof of Moschovakis’ Third Periodicity Theorem
(see Moschovakis [13, 6E.1]) adapted to games on R (see also [1, Lemma 2] for
a few more details). The only difference is that in the proof of [13, 6E.1], which
deals with games on N, one defines each step of the winning strategy by selecting
the least move which is “minimal” in the sense of [13, 6E.1]. In our setting, where
moves are elements of R, the collection of minimal moves is aRΠ1n+1, so we may
use the uniformization property to select one (this is why we require AD). 
——
What remains now is to keep the promises made in the introduction. The next
two lemmas together imply Theorem 1.3:
Lemma 4.2. Let n be odd and suppose that Π1n+2 games on R are determined,
then M ♯n(R) exists.
Proof. We apply Lemma 3.10 to n + 1. It suffices to show, assuming Π1n+2-
determinacy for games on reals, that Player I has a winning strategy in Gevenϕ ,
where ϕ is the formula “there is an active initial segment of me with n Woodin car-
dinals.” By Π1n+2-determinacy for games on reals, it suffices to show that Player
II does not have a winning strategy. Towards a contradiction, let σ be a winning
strategy for Player II. By Π1n+2-determinacy for games on N, M
♯
n+1(A) exists for
all A ∈ Pω1(R). Moreover, each M
♯
n+1(A) satisfies ϕ. Let X be a countable ele-
mentary substructure of some large Vκ, with σ ∈ X , and let W be the transitive
collapse of X . Write σ¯ for the image of σ under the collapse embedding. Consider
the play p of Gevenϕ in which Player I plays the theory of the unique initial segment
ofMn+1(R
W ) which is a minimal ϕ-witness, together with RW , and Player II plays
by σ. An argument as in [3, Lemma 3.8] shows that this play is won by Player I,
giving the desired contradiction. 
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that M ♯n+1(R) exists. Then, Π
1
n+1 games on R are deter-
mined.
Proof. This is almost immediate from Martin and Steel’s [9] or Neeman’s [16] proof
of projective determinacy.
Work in M ♯n+1(R). We actually only need that there are n Woodin cardinals
and a measurable above (within this model). By [16, Corollary 5.31], Π1n+1 games
14 JUAN P. AGUILERA AND SANDRA MU¨LLER
are determined. However, [16, Corollary 5.31] is a corollary of [16, Exercise 5.29]
and [16, Corollary 4.19], which are stated for games on an arbitrary set X . If we
take X = R, we may conclude the determinacy of games on R which are Π1n+1 in
the sense of Remark 2.2. By Corollary 2.3, this suffices.
We have shown that
M
♯
n+1(R) |= “Π
1
n+1-determinacy for games on R.”
Since M ♯n+1(R) contains all reals, and thus all countable sequences of reals and all
possible plays of any game on R, the existence of winning strategies is absolute to
V . This completes the proof. 
We conclude with the following strengthening of Theorem 1.5:
Theorem 4.4. Suppose M ♯n(R) exists. The following are equivalent:
(1) Π1n+1-determinacy for games on N of length ω
2;
(2) Π1n+1-determinacy for games on R of length ω and M
♯
n(R) |= AD.
Proof Sketch. Suppose that Π1n+1-determinacy for games on N of length ω
2 holds
and, towards a contradiction, that M ♯n(R) 6|= AD. By taking transitive collapses
of countable elementary substructures, one sees that there is a closed, cofinal C ⊆
Pω1(R) such that for all A ∈ C,
M ♯n(A) 6|= AD,
which contradicts [3, Theorem 3.1].
Conversely, suppose that Π1n+1 games on R of length ω are determined and that
M ♯n(R) |= AD. Assume for definiteness that n is even; the other case is similar.
By Theorem 3.1, all sets in aRΠ1n+1 are determined. The result now follows by
adapting the argument of [2, Lemma 3.11] exactly as in [2, Theorem 3.12]. This
is possible because all properties about L(R) used in argument have been verified
above to also hold of M ♯n(R); namely, the fact that L(R) is correct about Player
I winning Π11 games on R (which generalizes to M
♯
n(R) by Theorem 4.1), the fact
that Σ
L(R)
1 has the uniformization property (which generalizes to M
♯
n(R) by the
remark in the beginning of this section), as well as Solovay’s basis theorem (which
can be proved for M ♯n(R) the same way as for L(R); see Koellner-Woodin [5] for a
proof). 
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